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Supply, Demand, and the Making of a 
Market: Philadelphia and Havana at the 
Beginning of the Nineteenth Century 
Linda K. Salvucci 
In his 1984 assessment of the state of historical research, "The Transatlan-
tic Economy," Jacob Price comments: "The writing of most early American 
economic history has concentrated upon supply. For many branches of the 
economy, the great unexplored frontier may well be demand." The rela-
tionship between Philadelphia and Havana is a case in point. From the 
onset of the American Revolution until well past the end of the Napole-
onic Wars, the port cities of Havana and Philadelphia were inextricably 
linked. As their own rich hinterlands expanded, and as established trans-
atlantic trade routes disintegrated, Havana and Philadelphia grew ever closer, 
exerting profound inBucnccs upon their respective regional economics and 
merchants. Spaniards and Cubans alike considered Philadelphia the prin-
cipal entrep6t for United States foodstuffs shipped to the island while 
Havana emerged as the leading market for American exports through Phila-
delphia. This close relationship between the two ports predated the strong 
links between the newly independent nation and the Spanish colony that 
characterized most of the nineteenth century and contributed to the War 
of 1898. However, it was during the early years, from the l779os through 
the 1820s, that the fortunes of Philadelphia and H avana were most deeply 
affected by their reciprocal tradc.1 
In his seminal 1974 essay Jacob Price noted that the West Indies served 
as a key outlet for provisions from Philadelphia since the time of its foun-
dation. On the eve of the American Revolution, Philadelphia was the prin-
cipal Bour exporter in North America. Unfortunately, no reliable quan-
titative estimates of Philadelphia's early trade with Cuba are available. It 
is likely, however, that some of its products found their way from neighbor-
ing Caribbean islands to Havana despite official restrictions of direct tradc.2 
During the Revolutionary War, the governments of both the United States 
and Spain encouraged contact between the two ports. Then Spain tried 
to once again close its colony to American shippers in 1784 This belated 
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reversion to mercantilist policies proved unsuccessful. 3 Within a few years 
Cuba's sugar revolution was in full swing while hostilities in Europe en-
sured the United States a predominant role in the supply of foodstuffs, do-
mestic manufactures, European reexports, shipping services, and slaves to 
the island's burgeoning population. These American goods were exchanged 
for sugar, specie, and tropical produce. 
More often than not, Havana importers and bakers specified a preference 
for "Philadelphia Bour" while Philadelphia merchants assumed highly visi-
ble roles in the trade. Spanish policymakers struggled vainly to exert some 
control by means of an increased consular presence along the eastern sea-
board. The ranking Spanish commercial official resided in Philadelphia. 
He and his subordinates were supposed to issue licenses for selected ship-
ments of grain and other necessities to the island. Their correspondence, 
however, offers a striking testimony of the extent to which North Ameri-
cans had already penetrated the Cuba market, scandalously flaunting Bour-
bon regulations and frequenting the colony's ports "as if they were their 
own."4 This type of qualitative evidence strongly suggests that United States 
trade to Cuba was centered in Philadelphia at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. Complete runs of quantitative data are scarce for the years 
before l8:z.o. Extant sources include records of ship departures and arrivals 
as well as Bour price series for the respective ports. Later volume and value 
export statistics offer some insights into the significance of the Havana 
market for Philadelphia. 
For example, American customs officials compiled lists of clearances 
from Philadelphia to all foreign and domestic ports. These clearances may 
serve as a minimum indicator of direct trade and as a cough indicator of 
Cuban demand.5 Between 1794 and 182.2. the number of recorded depar-
tures from Philadelphia to Cuba grew on average by 4 percent per year, 
a sizeable rate of increase that implies a doubling of traffic every seventeen 
years.6 Let us examine the patterns more closely. From 1794 to 1802, but 
particularly during the "first neutral trade" of 1797- 991 outbound traffic 
grew steadily. Following a brief drop in 1802- 3, coinciding with the Peace 
of Amiens and a lack of circulating specie in Havana, declared sailings 
from Philadelphia increased sharply. With the resumption of global hostili-
ties and the proclamation of the "second neutral trade" from 1805 to 1807, 
they reached an all-rime peak in 1806 and 1807. Data for the first several 
months of 1808 are missing, but it is clear that Philadelphians dispatched 
ships to Havana even during the embargo imposed by President Jefferson. 7 
After this measure was superseded by the Non-Intercourse Act in March 
1809, clearances to Cuba increased although they failed to match pre-
embargo levels. Between 1809 and 1813 Philadelphia departures declined 
precipitously, as the British Navy interfered with much American shipping. 
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Table 2..1. Recorded Ship Traffic between Philadelphia and Cuba, 1783-182.2. 
Ytar Cltartd for Arrivtd from 
All Cuba Havana All Cuba Havana 
1783 n.a. n.a. (22] n.a. n.a. (18] 
1784 n.a. nJ. n.a. n.a. 
1785 n.a. n.a. [1] n.a. n.a. 
1786 n.a. n.a. [2] n.a. n.a. [5] 
1787 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. [1] 
1788 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. [1] 
1789 n.a. n.a. 3 1 (Aug.-Dec.) 
1790 n.a. n.a. 4 3 [5] 
1791 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1792 n.a. n.a. 8 8 
1793 6 6 n.a. n.a. (9] 
1794 33 32 n.a. n.a. [41] 
1795 23 22 29 29 Uan.-Junc) [34] 
1796 18 17 40 35 (35] 
1797 37 32 {48]n.a. n.a. 
1798 59 56 (58] 62 53 
1799 75 63 75 69 
1800 69 62 84 70 
1801 93 82 (98] 98 88 
1802 [23] 23 20 40 34 
1803 (13] 17 7 (20] 20 17 
1804 39 15 1391 13 5 Uan.-May) 
O nce the War of 18n concluded, sailings from Philadelphia to Cuba again 
displayed a positive t rend, which continued into the next decade, well past 
1818, when Spain granted Cuba the right to free trade in the world market.• 
To recapitulate, surviving U.S. customs records point to a vigorous and 
generally growing trade from Philadelphia to Cuba throughout the Napo-
leonic Era. (See table 2.1.) The trend was not uniform, and there were oc-
casions when war markedly disturbed the growth of the market. Never-
theless, between 1794 and 1822., the Cuban demand for provisions shipped 
through Philadelphia was first established and then enlarged. 
Over the course of the same three decades, Philadelphia's trade to Cuba 
diversified to the outports. Throughout the 1790s Havana did receive the 
overwhelming majority of Philadelphia vessels destined for the Spanish 
island. Only a scant few ships cleared directly for the next largest port, 
Santiago de Cuba. However, _by the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
departures to Santiago increased noticeably while other, smaller ports also 
appeared on the lists. Philadelphia's traffic with Cuba continued to diver-
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Table 2..1. Continued 
Year Cleared for Arrived from 
All C"ba Havana All C"ba Havana 
1805 78 46 n.a. n.a. 
1806 117 66 (lll)n.a. n.a. 
1807 [115)"56 40 Uan.-July) [138)n.a. n.a. 
1808 25 20 (May-Dec.) n.a. n.a. 
1809 [80) 91 50 [91) n.a. n.a. 
1810 79 57 n.a. n.a. 
1811 73 41 n.a. n.a. 
1812 38 18 n.a. n.a. 
1813 25 16 n.a. n.a. 
1814 33 32 n.a. n.a. 
1815 65 39 n.a. n.a. 
1816 60 37 19 12 (Oct.-Dec.) 
1817 60 38 8 4 (Mar.-Apr.) 
1818 69 39 n.a. n.a. 
1819 75 38 n.a. n.a. 
1820 91 47 n.a. n.a. 
1822 100 50 n.a. n.a. 
SouRCES: Figures in [ ] arc from Roy F. Nichols, "Trade Relations and the Establish-
ment of the United States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 13 (August 1933): :1.89-313. Figur.:s in I I arc taken from cham supplied 
by Valentin Faronda in Archivo Hist6rico Nacional (Madrid), Secci6n de Estado, lcgajo 
6175 bis. 
n.a. = not available in consulted American primary sources. 
sify after the War of 1812.. By 18u only one-half of all its clearances went to 
Havana. Santiago; the rapidly expanding Matanzas and, to a far lesser ex-
tent, Nuevitas, Trinidad, and Baracoa received the remainder.' Planters out-
side the Cuban capital increasingly fostered their own direct state-side con-
nections. Havana no longer monopolized the colony's commerce with the 
United States although it did continue to dominate it. These trends arc 
hardly surprising, given the growing white, free black, and slave popula-
tions; the geographical expansion of sugar cultivation on the island; and 
the entry of new American merchants into the profitable Cuban trade. 
Extant arrivals data for Philadelphia from Havana arc far less complete 
than the departures series. Still, the recorded yearly entrances track closely 
with the clearances, implying a strong bilateral trade between these ports. 
To the extent that seasonal cycles can be determined, the number of arriv-
als and departures both tended to increase across the calendar year. This 
pattern suggests some coordination between vessel traffic and the Pcnnsyl-
--- ATLANTIC STAPLE TRADE: ECONOMICS OF TRADE -- 651 
Linda K. Salvucci 44 
vania wheat harvest. Departures from Philadelphia peaked in the third and 
fourth quarters Uune through November). By late summer or early fall 
enough time had elapsed for the American crop to be harvested, milled, 
transported to the city, inspected, sold, and loaded on ships. Those ships de-
parting on a late fall schedule-as they did with greater frequency after 
1815-left Philadelphia before fear of ice on the Delaware River became a real 
threat. By so doing they arrived in Cuba close to the beginning of the sugar 
harvest (around December). However, if the same shippers planned to carry 
the island product back to Philadelphia for refining, the figures should reflect 
a higher number of arrivals early in the new year. But this is not the case. In-
sofar as the fragmentary arrivals data for Philadelphia are representative, 
they indicate that inward traffic was greatest during the fourth quarter. Thus 
it appears that Havana served Philadelphia primarily as an agricultural ex-
port market rather than a cyclical source of sugar imports.10 
In other words, the bilateral trade was driven more by Cuban demand 
for provisions than by the mainland demand for sugar. Small wonder, then, 
that commercial politics were centered on the commodity Bour. As pointed 
out below, operators like the Conde de Mopox y Jaruco and his cronies 
schemed to profit by restricting the Bour supply and thus distorting the 
market in Havana. Their activities illustrate how political power and rent 
seeking went hand in hand during the Napoleonic Era. 
Of course Philadelphia's relationship with Cuba needs to be examined in 
the context of its total outbound traffic. A 10 percent sample of all recorded 
clearances from Philadelphia between 1794 and 1822 confirms the signifi-
cance of Caribbean destinations in general and of Cuban ones in particular.11 
The Caribbean as a whole accounted for nearly one-half of all departures 
and two-fifths of all tonnage declared for foreign ports at Philadelphia. 
When the islands are classified by parent state, the Spanish possessions-
primarily Cuba but also Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico-easily outrank 
the others as Philadelphia's preferred trading partners. This pattern appears 
to have stabilized over time. Moreover, when individual Caribbean ports are 
ranked by tonnage at five-year intervals, Havana usually occupies either first 
or second place while Santiago frequently ranks within the top five as well. 
Furthermore, in 1800 and 1805, Havana led all foreign clearances from 
Philadelphia, including those to Europe and the Far East. 
Thus Havana (and, to a lesser extent, Santiago) exerted a d~mand for 
Philadelphia's exports all out of proportion to its size. To apply Price's 
model, the growing Cuban market had profound ramifications for Phila-
delphia. Merchants, shippers, millers, coopers, carters, and farmers all 
profited from this trade.12 
Ship manifests, insurance policies, and aggregate trade statistics for the 
United States and Cuba shed some light on the composition of outbound 
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merchandise. By all indications the principal export from Philadelphia and 
the rest of the mainland as well was domestically produced Bour. In 1790, 
for example, this commodity alone accounted for approximately 50 per-
cent of the value of total American exports to the Spanish West Indies, 
a reliable proxy for Cuba.13 Unfortunately, comparable estimates are not 
available for the intervening period down to 1821. For that year, however, 
the value of United States Bour sent to Cuba amounted to $6751952, repre-
senting 23 percent of the value of all domestic exports there and nearly 
16 percent of American Bour exports worldwide.14 
Aside from Bour, the United States sent a wide assortment of other pro-
visions to the island. Pork products, wood (processed into staves, planks, 
and containers for sugar), tallow candles, soap, rice, and footwear trailed 
Bour by value on the aggregate level in 1821. Individual cargoes usually 
included some combinations of the following foodstuffs as well: fish, beef, 
dairy products, other grains and flours (com, rye, barley), legumes (beans, 
peas, potatoes), apples, and beer. Nails, agricultural implements, cottons, 
hats, coaches, furniture, gunpowder, medicines, horses, and mules also ap-
peared with varying frequency. Spanish imperial authorities taxed most 
of these impons, reserving preferential rates not for the needed comestibles 
but for wood and iron products. The composition of Cuba-bound cargoes 
did not appear to change dramatically between 1779 and 1823. However, 
the dollar value of domestic produce sent from the United States tended 
to increase after 1803 as the overall value of reexports dropped off. On 
the whole, then, trade with Cuba provided Americans with a ready outlet 
for their agricultural surpluses and simple manufactures even as U.S. ship-
pers dominated at least 40 percent of Cuba's foreign trade.is 
As far as cargoes sent back from Cuba are concerned, in 1821 over 60 
percent of the sugar products that entered the United States came from 
Cuba.1' Still, sugar was not always the commodity Americans preferred. 
Especially for· those also active on other routes, specie became an attrac-
tive return cargo. Havana received regular influxes of hard coin from the 
Viceroyalty of New Spain, and it is dear that hundreds of thousands of 
these pesos Bowed northward annually. One British diplomat estimated 
that over $500,000 of Spanish American silver entered Philadelphia alone 
in 1787.17 Several years later Stephen Girard's resident correspondent in 
Havana accumulated such massive amounts of coin that he had to hoard 
and even bury some before completing shipments off the island.1' Aside 
from functioning as direct remittance for goods and services, specie was 
carried by American merchants to be minted or transferred to accounts 
in Europe. For example, the Philadelphia merchant John Leamy took out 
six separate insurance policies in March 1794 to protect specie-laden ships 
departing Havana with quantities ranging in value from $7,000 to $24,000. 
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Six months later he purchased another policy on S8o,ooo worth of pesos 
to be transported on at least four different ships. Finally, American. ship 
captains smuggled out thousands of pesos on individual voyages. Usually 
coins were concealed in the bottoms of sugar containers." 
Much as they tried, Spanish imperial officials could not stop the drain 
of hard currency from Cuba. They did, however, attempt to link specie 
exports to the slave trade in order to augment the colony's labor force. As 
of 1802, specie could be legitimately exported from Cuba only as proceeds 
from the sale of slaves. Another policy implemented in 1789 had tied slaves 
to Bour importations as well. Flour-laden ships from the United States 
received preferential treatment if they also brought in unfree blacks.20 
American Bour merchants thus had two incentives to participate in the slave 
trade to Cuba. But the extent to which they did so remains unclear. While 
some United States slavers, usually based in New England, made large de-
liveries directly from Africa, many American vessels appear to have stopped 
at nearby Dutch and Danish islands on their way to Cuba. There they 
picked up only a few slaves, at most enough to facilitate the discharge of 
their Bour cargoes in the Spanish West Indies. Additional evidence from 
consular and business correspondence suggests that at least some Bour 
traders from Philadelphia operated accordingly. 21 
If not all North American ships entered Havana harbor with slaves on 
board, it is hard to imagine that many arrived without Bour. Quantities 
ranged from a few dozen to a few thousand barrels, rendering average 
estimates unhelpful. For example:, fifteen Bour-laden American vesscls-
all but three from Philadelphia-were legally admitted between April 14 
and June 25, 1796. The median number of American barrels delivered was 
897; however, individual cargoes ranged from 57 to 2,240 barrels.12 Other 
evidence implies that large-scale operators such as Leamy and Girard tried 
to send around 2,000 barrels per voyage. U.S. suppliers faced no serious 
competition on the Havana flour market, which expanded rapidly after 
1790. But how large was it? Even imperial bureauaats, intent upon minimiz-
ing their estimates, conceded that Cuba took over loo,ooo barrels per year 
in the first decade of the nineteenth century. By 1829 official annual im-
ports surpassed 200,000 barrels.23 Still, American sellers did not have an 
easy time in Havana. Delays in unloading together with improper storage, 
capricious enforcement of commercial regulations, and a system whereby 
the powerful bakers' guild purchased most of the Bour, all interfered with 
the efficient transaction of business. 
The instability of the Havana Bour market is further demonstrated by 
comparing selling prices there and in Philadelphia. Since neither colonial 
officials nor Cuban newspapers regularly recorded flour prices, one must 
look to American letters, periodicals, and prices current for information 
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regarding both ports. Fortunately the papers of Philadelphian Stephen 
Girard contain enough data to allow the construction of a series for Havana 
that runs from February 1797 to February 1824. Girard often complained 
about the sluggish Bow of information northward, but his agents sent 
relatively frequent quotations.24 In short, the paired prices demonstrate 
the distorting effects of the Napoleonic Wars because only after 1815 did 
American and Cuban prices consistently move together.25 
It is instructive to scrutinize this price series by quarters. Between Janu-
ary 1797 and December 1801 a barrel of Philadelphia Bour sold in Havana 
for anywhere from $13.50 to $2+00. For this period only there is a slight 
negative correlation - implying an inverse relationship- between prices in 
Havana and those from the preceding month in Philadelphia. Why should 
rising prices have prevailed in Cuba when falling prices were current in Penn-
sylvania? A plausible explanation for the most dramatic episode, which oc-
curred at the end of 1798, involves the royal concession granted to the Conde 
de Mopox y Jaruco to supply the island with 100,000 barrels of Bour.26 As 
delivery and sales were channeled through the Mopox network in 1797 and 
1798, prices in Havana initially rose. But in their haste to transport the pref-
erentially taxed Bour to Cuba, his agents soon glutted the market. Worse 
still, these barrels were so improperly stored that bakers refused to purchase 
the "moldy·merchandise." Their written protests correspond closely with the 
drop in prices in Havana during the second half of 1798. 27 
Philadelphia and Havana Bour prices were again noticeably at odds dur-
ing the last six months of 1800 when, it appears, a specie crisis was to 
blame. According to contemporary assessments there simply was not enough 
currency in circulation to facilitate purchases. On July 15 Girard's correspon-
dent wrote: "The market is extremely dull, Bour the only good article, cash 
very scarce."21 Then, more than 150 American vessels arrived in Havana 
during the first three weeks of September. The available supply of fresh 
foodstuffs was thus inflated, further aggravating a dismal situation for sellers. 
Yet this was not the only occasion when multiple arrivals played havoc with 
the market. Indeed, concurrent deliveries of large quantities of Bour prob-
ably affected sales more adversely than any other short-term factor. 2' 
For the second and third quarters analyzed, which respectively cover 
the years from 1802 to 1807 and from 1808 to 1814, there are no obvious 
statistical relationships between price movements in Havana and Philadel-
phia. Cuban prices varied widely, from a low of $12 in March 1807 to an 
all-time high of $56 in September 1808. Despite the United States embargo 
having been in effect since December 1807, prices in Havana did not peak 
for another several months. Contact had not effectively ceased, it appears, 
until the end of 1808 when Cuban merchants requested provisions and 
vessels alike, and island inhabitants reportedly turned to locally grown 
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roots and vegetables. 30 As soon as the embargo was lifted, dozens of Ameri-
can ships raced to Havana. Within weeks (April 1809), flour sold at a mere 
Sr8 per barrel. Further disruptions occurred during the War of 1812. but 
were never as severe as those contemporaneous with Jefferson's embargo. 31 
These two Anglo-Ameoon factors, it appears, proved far more damaging 
than the myriad commercial regulations the Bourbons tried to enforce. 
The fourth quarter in the series comprises the period from 1815 through 
1824. Cuban quotations never approached the peaks of the preceding two 
periods. Furthermore for the first and only time flour prices in Havana 
and Philadelphia tended to move in the same direction; that is, they rose 
and fell together. 32 These trends, along with the stabilized patterns of vessel 
traffic discussed above, suggest that sustained peace brought a closer in-
tegration of the respective flour markets. In other words, the link between 
Philadelphia and Havana was normalized once the fighting had ended and 
essentially peacetime trading conditions prevailed. 
In some ways the Cuba market held even greater significance for Phila-
delphia after the Napoleonic Wars. Indeed by the end of the second decade 
of the nineteenth century Cuba remained one of the few routes on which 
Philadelphia's outbound traffic had not registered either an absolute or a 
relative decline. 33 Rather, Havana and the outports continued to function 
as ready outlets for domestic produce and, to a far lesser extent, for reex-
ported goods. In comparative terms, Philadelphia's ties to Cuba were on 
the order of three times stronger than the nation's as a whole. In 1821, 
Cuba was the declared destination of 6. 7 percent of all domestically pro-
duced U.S. exports by value. However, for the Philadelphia customs district, 
the same figure is 18.6 percent, worth over half a million dollars. 34 More-
over, of all U.S. domestic exports to Cuba in 1821, nearly 20 percent had 
been shipped through Philadelphia. The same trade in agricultural surpluses 
that had been nurtured since prerevolutionary times by Quaker city mer-
chants still predominated more than half a century later. The regional 
agricultural savings emphasized in Price's model were closely linked to the 
Cuba trade well into the nineteenth century. 
Another extant set of local statistics from 1819 through 1827 suggests 
that the benchmark year of 1821 was typical. When the nine annual totals 
are combined, Cuba emerges as the leading destination of recorded domes-
tic exports from Philadelphia. (See table 2.2.) Other regions of Spanish 
America-.most notably Mexico-also figured quite prominently in Phila-
delphia's outbound trade. However, each of these hemispheric destinations 
received a far larger proportion of reexports than Cuba did. Rankings by 
value of total exports (that is,. domestic exports plus reexports) reveal that 
only China outranked Cuba, and it did so overwhelmingly on the strength 
of reexpons.35 (See tables 2..3 and 2..4.) Again Spain's "ever faithful isle" 
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Table 2..2.. Recorded Total Value (Dollars) of Domestic Exports from Philadelphia 
to Principal Foreign Trading Panners, 1819-27 
Rank Trading Partner Value 
1. Cuba 4,855,633 
2. England 4,398,736 
3. Danish West Indies 2,398,736 
[Spanish American nations] [2,631 ,632] 
4. Spanish American colonies 1,480,428 
5. Brazil 1,465,190 
6. Haiti 1,399,716 
7. Other Spanish West Indies 1,330,744 
8. Gib1altar 1,274,858 
9. British West Indies 1,025,349 
10. China 1,022,022 
SOURCE: HatJJrd's Register of Pennsylvania 1 (October 1818), :r.04-5. 
Each of the remaining thirty·6Ye categories listed has a combined value for domestic ex· 
pom of under Sr million for these nine years. Many of these individual catcgori~ reftcct 
changes in political sovereignty in Spanish America during this interval. For example there 
are no figures for "Spanish American Colonies" after 1814 while separate listings for Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires begin that same year. If these separate listings are 
combined as "Spanish American nations" (as above), the domestic expons sent from Phila· 
dclphia amount to S:r.,631,~31, placing them fourth on the above list. 
seemed a particularly appropriate market for Philadelphia and its grain· 
producing hinterland, not only according to Jeffersonian political economy 
but also according to longstanding patterns of commercial exchange." 
Over time, however, such persistent and deepening reliance on Havana 
and other Cuban outlets affected Philadelphia adversely. Yet this is not 
because these markets were stagnant, as Anglo·Americanists routinely 
assume. Rather, recent research by Caribbeanists convincingly demonstrates 
that the size and wealth of Cuba's population continued to grow well into 
the nineteenth century. 37 As far as demand is concerned, then, this story 
is dynamic and multi-faceted. In the early 1790s Havana and its environs 
were able to shift most local resources into sugar production, in large part 
because of a sure and steady supply of foodstuffs from Pennsylvania. The 
rapidly expanding white and black populations, the annual inftux of thou-
sands of silver pesos from New Spain, as well as the de facto loosening 
of Bourbon commercial rcstriaions during wartime, made Cuba ever more 
attractive to merchants on the American mainland. 
Coinciding with the island's sugar revolution, the opening of Spanish 
imperial trade to neutrals in 1797 proved to be a watershed event. Before 
then, a small circle of Philadelphia Bour dealers, men who cleverly ex· 
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Table 2.3. Recorded Value (Dollars) of Total Exports from Philadelphia 
to Principal Foreign Trading Partners, 1819-17 
Ra nit Trading Partner Value Percentage of 
Reexports 
1. China 12,837,583 92 
2. Cuba 7,605,609 36 
3. England 6,032,265 27 
4. Spanish American Colonies 5,155,495 71 
5. Mexico 4,772,453 80 
6. Danish West Indies 4,772,453 42 
7. Hanse towns 4,766,367 84 
[Spanish American nations] (3,440,533) (51) 
8. Gibraltar 3,005,791 57 
9. Haiti 2,320,055 39 
10. British East Indies 2,279,501 74 
11. Holland 2,213,418 87 
12. Brazil 2,121,042 31 
13. Other Spanish West Indies 2,037,560 34 
SoullCE: Hazard's Register of Pennsylvania l. (October 1828), l.04-5. 
Each of the remaining thirty·two categories listed has a combined value for total exports 
for these nine years of under S1 million. Five of these categories arc combined as "Spanish 
American nations"; in this instance Mexico is not included since it already appears in the 
rankings. 
ploitcd religious, familial, and bureaucratic tics, had dominated the Cuba 
route. 38 Of course they were best positioned to reap the first and fastest 
profits from the escalating demand for provisions and manufactured goods. 
However, opportunities in Havana were so great by the turn of the century 
that the ranks of American exporters swelled both in Philadelphia and in 
neighboring rival ports. For the next several decades Cuba depended upon 
the United States not only for more foodstuffs but for more reexports, ship-
ping services and, following the independence of Mexico, capital for in-
vestment in the sugar industry. Yet, in general, Philadelphians failed to react 
effectively to the more diversined island market. The old-time suppliers 
either died or left the trade while a larger number of smaller shippers con-
tinued to send cargoes composed mainly of provisions.3' In contrast, New 
York merchants were in a strong position to service the enhanced needs 
of the Spanish colony. Like Philadelphia, New York possessed a rich agri-
cultural hinterland; unlike Philadelphia, New York aggressively pursued 
close trading connections with Europe which enabled it to function not 
only as a distribution point for regional produce but as an international 
cntrepot. By the early 1820s Cuban hacendados could deal with northern 
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Table 2..4. Recorded Value (dollars) of Domestic Exports and Reexports from 
Philadelphia to Cuba, 1819-2.7 
Year Domestic Exports Reexports 
1819 NR• NR 
[760,959)~ [NR) 
1820 112:792 205,486 
[467,440t [680,144)b 
1821 559,183 265,303 
1822 592,417 301,287 
1823 694,869 434,053 
1824 599,736 388,500 
1825 666,118 324,955 
1826 628,336 459,479 
1827 942,182 370,976 
Totals 4,855,633 2,749,976 
SOURCE: Hazard's Register of Pennsylvania l. (October 1818), 104-5. 
•NR = not recorded. 
Total 
[760,959t 
378,278 
[1,147,584)b 
824,486 
893,704 
1,128,922 
988,236 
991,073 
1,087,815 
1,313,077 
7,605,609 
~alues for "Other Spanish West Indies"; "Cuba" became a separate category at some 
point during 1810. Thereafter values for other Spanish West Indies never exceeded more than 
a few thousand dollars. Braketed figur-es are not included in any of the totals. 
firms that offered a complete package of services including financing, 
transportation, and marketing of tropical products; access to manufactured 
and luxury goods; as well as increased supplies of food. Given the alter-
natives, it seems hardly a coincidence that New York, not Philadelphia, 
emerged as the center of the foreign sugar trade. 40 
A final factor on the supply side illustrates the eventual consequences 
of Philadelphia's adherence to traditional patterns of exchange with Cuba 
following the Napoleonic Wars. Because flour prices fell in Pennsylvania 
beginning in the late 1810s, the terms of trade turned against Philadelphia. 
Between 1803 and 1807 Philadelphia had exported u1,136 barrels of flour 
valued annually at $1,647,624 on average per annum. By 1821 Philadelphia 
exported 219,013 barrels of Bour valued at Sx,025,082. In other words, 
while exporting nearly the same quantity of Bour in the later year, Phila-
delphia earned $622,542 a year less, a difference of some 47 percent. 41 This 
figure serves as an approximate measure of how changes in the terms of 
trade from the war years now benefitted partners like Cuba at the same 
time that they cost Philadelphia. Without the disproportionately high profits 
of the neutral trade of the war years, flour merchants, shippers, millers, 
and other Philadelphians could not accumulate capital as rapidly as they 
once had. So lucrative and secure in the last quarter of the eighteenth cen-
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tury, the Cuba trade had diverted Philadelphia from extensive panicipa-
tion on other routes, especially those involving cotton and European manu-
factures. Yet this early success became a liability once the Havana market 
became too lucrative for other American competitors to ignore. Just as 
predominance in the Cuba trade paralleled the ascendancy of Philadelphia 
in the Revolutionary Era, changes in the structure of demand in Havana 
after 1800 contributed to Philadelphia's decline. 
NOTES 
r. Linda Kerrigan Salvucci, "Development and Decline: The Port of Philadelphia 
and Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-18z.J'' (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Univcristy, 198s); 
L. K. Salvucci, "The American Export Trade to Cuba, 1790-1898: Trends and Sig-
nificance" (Paper presented at Annual Meeting of Southwestern Social Science Associa-
tion, San Antonio, March 20, 1986). 
2. Jacob M. Price, "Economic Function and the Growth of American Port Towns 
in the Eighteenth Cennuy," Perspectives in American History 8 (1974): 123~5. esp. ISl-57· 
Also sec Thomas M. Docr6ingcr, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and 
Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, 1986); and Carmelo Richard Arena, "Philadelphia-
Spanish New Orleans Trade: 1789-1803'' (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1959), 
16o. 
3. James A. Lewis, "Anglo-American Entrepreneurs in Havana: The Background 
and Significance of the Expulsion of 1784-1785,~ and Linda K. Salvucci, "Anglo-American 
Merchants and Stratagems for Success in Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-18o7," in 
Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kucthc, eds., The North American Role in the Spanish 
Imperial Economy, q76-18z.6 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), u2-33 
and 210-17. The essay by Allan Kuethe in chapter 1 of the present volume also points 
to Havana's heightened demand for American foodstuffs. 
4. Manuel Moreno Fraginals, The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Comp/a of.Sugar 
in Cuba, 176o-1860, trans. Cedric Belfragc (New York: Monthly Review Press, i976), 
vol. 1. Salvucci, "Development and Decline," chaps. 2 and 3. Paraphrasing a charge 
made on several occasions by Spanish consuls resident in the United States, the captain 
general of Cuba conceded that North American merchants "haccn cl Contrabando en 
los Puertos de csta Isla, frcquentfodolos tanto como los suyos proprios" (engage in 
contraband in the ports of this island, frequenting them as if they were their own). 
Someruelos to Ceballos, Havana, August 1, 18o6, Archivo Hist6rico Nacional (Madrid), 
Estado, legajo 6175 bis. 
S· The clearances data for Philadelphia were compiled from two sources: Bureau 
of Customs, French Spoliation Claims, District of Pennsylvania, Outward Books, 1793-
1801, Record Group 36, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Arrivals and Clearances 
of Vessels, Philadelphia, 1801-z.z.1 section 3, vols. z.-s (Outward), Maritime Records 
of the Port of Philadelphia (Unpublished carbon copies of typed transcripts prepared 
by the WPA, sponsored by the Pennsylvania Historical Commission, [1942)), Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C. For a complete assessment of the accuracy and utility 
of these sources, sec Salvucci, "Development and Decline," z.4z.-47. Obviously they do 
not include illegal or contraband voyages; however, such traffic would only augment 
660 ------ AMERICAN MARKETS 
53 Supply, Demand, and the Making of a Market 
the totals for Cuba. Some conBating of the terms "Philadelphia" and "Pennsylvania" 
and "Havana" and "Cuba" is inesc:ipable due to changing definit ions of categories in 
the sources. 
6. A regression was run on the figures in the column "Cleared for All Cuba" in table 
:z..1. The estimated equation is: log sailings = J.:l.I + .04 time + .62 neutral trade 
where time is a time index set at I for 1794 and neutral trade is a dummy variable set 
at 1 for years of the neutral trade. The estimated coefficients arc both significant at the 
99 percent level. The 4 percent rate of change is of course the coefficient of the time index. 
7. Between May 4 and August 13, 1808, some twenty-one vessels listed Cuban destina-
tions in the official customs records referred to in note 5. From September through 
December at least six additional ships cleared for the Spanish island. Most likely some 
Phil:rdelphia merchants had received permission from the U.S. Treasury to dispatch ships 
to Cuba to pick up property (already purchased sugar and other cargoes). Additional 
evidence suggests that Bour and similar goods were carried southward: Iriarte y Lasa 
to Girard, Havana, June 14 and December 2.9, 1808, Stephen Girard Papers, Letters 
Received, roll 43, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia. George Terry Sharrer, 
"Flour Milling and the Growth of Baltimore, 1783-1830" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Maryland, 1975), 136, notes that 594 special licenses-mostly for exports to the West 
Indies-were granted to U.S. merchants between December 1807 and October 1808. 
8. Sec table :z..1. Note the steady increase in departures for the last six years in the 
series. 
9. In 182.2., for example, fifty ships cleared Philadelphia for Havana; San'tiago fol-
lowed with seventeen while Matanzas took fourteen, and a handful went to each of 
the other ports. Such diversification of clearances from Philadelphia fits nicely into the 
economic and demographic patterns discussed in Franklin W. Knight, "Origins of Wealth 
and the Sugar Revolution in Cuba, 1750-1850," Hispanic American Historical Review 
57, no. 2. (1977): :z.31-53. 
10. The procedure for calculating traffic by quarters is explained in Salvucci, "Develop-
ment and Decline," 310- 11. Departures data are drawn from the sources in note 5. Re-
corded arrivals data are complete only for the year 1790, 1791, and 1798 through 1803; 
they are compiled from the Impost Books of the Collector of Customs at Philadelphia, 
1789-1804, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., Microcopy T-155, 
rolls 1-6. 
Evidence on the timing of the sugar harvest comes from [Robert F. Jameson] Letters 
from the Havana during the Year :c820: Containing an Account of the Present State 
of the Island of Cuba and Observations on the Slave Trade (London: J. Miller, 182.1), 
12.1. Moreover David E. Dauer, "Colonial Philadelphia's Intraregional Transportation 
System: An Overview,'' in Glenn Porter and William H. Mulligan, Jr., eds., Working 
Papers from the Regional Economic History Research Center l., no. 3 (r979): 7 and 
15, notes that fall was the peak period for trampers carrying wheat and flour from the 
hinterland and that freight volumes into Philadelphia more than tripled between mid-
summer and late fall. 
11. Salvucci, "Development and Decline,'' chap 4, offers a full analysis of Philadel-
phia's total outbound traffic as well as a description of the sampling techniques employed. 
11. Salvucci, "Development and Decline," chap. 4, especially l.00-2.05, :z.z6-18. The 
years ranked include 1795, 1800, 1805, 1810, 1815, and 1810. Neither Philadelphia nor 
perhaps even the United States as a whole had to depend too heavily upon British West 
Indian outlets in the Napoleonic Era. Any costs associated with leaving the British Em-
pire were at least partially offset by increased demand for American provisions in neigh-
ATLANTIC STAPLE TRADE: ECONOMICS OF TRADE -- 661 
Linda K. Salvucci 54 
boring Caribbean outlets. Sec also John H. Coatsworth, "American Trade with Euro-
pean Colonies in the Caribbean and South America, 1790- 1812.," William and Mary 
Quarterly 24 {April 1967): 143-66; and Price, "Economic Function," 154-56. 
13. The dollar value of the American flour was $69,896 according to Roy F. Nichols, 
"Trade Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish 
America, 1779-1809," Hispanic American Historical Review 8 {August 1933): 292. 
"Spanish "West Indies" !)lay be taken as a valid proxy for American trade with Cuba 
before 1821 since balances with Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo were minimal whenever 
specified. 
14. In 182.2. U.S. flour sent to Cuba was valued at $918,339, accounting for 18 per-
cent of all American Bour exports and exceeding those to any other destination. Data 
for 1821 and 182.2. arc found ,in Walter Lowrie and Matthew Clarke, eds., American 
Stau Papers, Class IV. Commerce and Navigation, 2 vols. {Washington, D.C.: Gales 
and Seaton, 1832), 2: 563, 575, 694. Harry I. Bernstein, Origins of Inter-American In-
terest, 1700-181:1. {Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945), 88-89, asserts 
that Cuba took some 25 percent of total American flour exports by value in 1825-i.6. 
15. Rankings for 1821 were compiled from Lowrie and Clarke, 2:557-74. After flour 
{$675,952) came pork products {$419,330), wood {$358,432), tallow candles and.soap 
{S179,733), rice ($166,475), boots and shoes ($135,860). The statement regarding in-
dividual cargoes is based on a familiarity with U.S. Treasury records, insurance policies, 
Spanish consular and U.S. merchants' correspondence, and Maria Encarnaci6n Rodgrl-
gucz Vicente's "El comercio cubano y la guerra de cmancipaci6n nortcamcricana," 
Anuario de Estudios Americanos II (1954): 61-106. 
For an indication of how duties were pegged in Cuba, sec List of New Regulated 
Duties for Imports into Havana, Havana, May 1, 1809, Girard Papers, roll 224. Ramon 
de la Sagra, Historia econ6mica polltica y estadfstica de la Isla de Cuba (La Habana: 
Impr. de las viudas Arazoza y Soler, 1831), 204, confirms the dominance of American 
shipping in Cuba. Figures from Lowrie and Clarke, 2:605-6, suggest that U.S. depar-
tures to and arrivals from Cuba each accounted for 96 percent of total tonnage recorded 
for this route in 182.1. Of all recorded American tonnage that entered the United States 
in that year, 14 percent came from Cuba: of all registered departing tonnage, 13 percent 
declared for Cuba. 
16. Sugar imports into the United States from Cuba arc calculated from data by 
volume from Lowrie and Clarke, 2:652. With these sources, there is no way to deter-
mine how much Cuban sugar entered Philadelphia. 
17. For the 1787 estimate sec Arthur P. Whitaker, "Recd and Forde: Merchant Adven-
tures of Philadelphia," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 61 (1937): 
244- 45. Alexander von Humboldt, The Island of Cuba, trans. J. B. Thrasher (New York: 
Derby and Jackson, 1856), 296, maintains that nearly one and a half million pesos de-
parted Cuba in 1813. 
Contemporaries recognized how the situado, or silver shipmcntS sent from New Spain 
to meet government expenditures in Cuba, ultimately benefittcd U.S. traders. Timothy 
Pitkin observed in his Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States (Hartford, 
1817), 192: "It is from this quarter [the Spanish West Indies and American possessions) 
that the United States obtains large quantities of the precious metals, by which they 
arc enabled to carry on a trade with China and the East Indies, as well as to pay the 
balances due, in Europe and elsewhere." 
18. Recurring problems with specie are discussed in Dobignie to Girard, Havana, 
January ro, February 15 and 23, April 19, 20, and 29, May 3, June 2.2., July 15, August 
30, September 7, 18, and 13, 1800, Girard Papers, rolls 21-23. On more than one occ-
662------- AMERICAN MARKETS 
55 Supply, Demand, and the Making of a Market 
sion the usually optimistic Dobignie urged Girard to abandon his Cuban trade once 
all collected proceeds were removed. 
19. Marine Blotters (bound photocopies), Insurance Company of North America 
Archives (Philadelphia), vol. C, 15-19; vol. D, 180. Premiums on specie cargoes were 
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